How did Japan become in to International Affairs?(Theoretical Perspective of International Relations)

How did Japan become in to International Affairs?(Theoretical Perspective of International Relations)

  • Introduction

International relations of Japan is handled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Since the surrender after World War II and the Treaty of San Francisco, Japanese diplomatic policy has been based on close partnership with the United States and the emphasis on the international cooperation such as the United Nations. In the Cold War, Japan took a part in the Western world‘s confrontation of the Soviet Union in East Asia. In the rapid economic developments in the 1960s and 1970s, Japan recovered its influences and became regarded as one of the major powers in the world. However, Japanese influences are regarded as negative by two particular countries: China and South Korea.

During the Cold War, Japanese foreign policy was not self-assertive, relatively focused on their economic growth. However, the end of the Cold War and bitter lessons from the Gulf War changed the policy slowly. Japanese government decided to participate in the Peacekeeping operations by the UN, and sent their troops to Cambodia, Mozambique, Golan Heights and the East Timor in the 1990s and 2000s. After the September 11 attacks, Japanese naval vessels have been assigned to re-supply duties in the Indian Ocean to the present date. The Ground Self-Defense Force also dispatched their troops to Southern Iraq for the restoration of basic infrastructures.

Beyond its immediate neighbors, Japan has pursued a more active foreign policy in recent years, recognizing the responsibility which accompanies its economic strength. Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda stressed a changing direction in a policy speech to the Diet: “Japan aspires to become a hub of human resource development as well as for research and intellectual contribution to further promote cooperation in the field of peace-building[1].” This follows the modest success of a Japanese-conceived peace plan which became the foundation for nationwide elections in Cambodia in 1998.

  • Why Japan did not like opening?

It is conventionally regarded that the shogunate imposed and enforced the sakoku policy in order to remove the colonial and religious influence of primarily Spain and Portugal, which was perceived as posing a threat to the stability of the shogunate and to peace in the archipelago. The increasing number of Catholic converts in southern Japan (mainly Kyūshū) was a significant element of that which was seen as a threat. Based on work conducted by Japanese historians in the 1970s some scholars have however challenged this view, believing it to only be a partial explanation of political reality. The motivations for the gradual strengthening of the maritime prohibitions during the early 17th century should be considered within the context of the Tokugawa bakufu’s domestic agenda. One element of this agenda was to acquire sufficient control over Japan’s foreign policy so to not only guarantee social peace, but to also maintain Tokugawa supremacy over the other powerful lords in the country, particularly the tozama daimyo. These daimyo had used East Asian trading linkages to profitable effect during the sengoku period, which allowed them to build up their military strength as well. By restricting the daimyo’s ability to trade with foreign ships coming to Japan or pursue trade opportunities overseas, the Tokugawa bakufu could ensure none would become too powerful to challenge the bakufu’s supremacy. This is consistent with the generally agreed rationale for the Tokugawa bakufu’s implementation of the system of alternate attendance, or sankin kōtai. Directing trade predominantly through Nagasaki, which came under Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s control in 1587, would enable the bakufu, through taxes and levies, to bolster its own treasury. This was no small matter as lack of wealth had limited both the preceding Kamakura bakufu and the Muromachi bakufu in crucial ways. The focus on the removal of Western and Christian influence from the Japanese archipelago as the main driver of the kaikin could be argued to be a somewhat eurocentric reading of Japanese history, although it is a common perception2.

Nevertheless Christianity, and the two colonial powers it was most strongly associated with, were seen as genuine threats by the Tokugawa bakufu. Once the remnants of the Toyotomi clan had been defeated in 1615, Tokugawa Hidetada turned his attention to the sole remaining credible challenge to Tokugawa supremacy. Religious challenges to central authority were taken seriously by the bakufu as ecclesiastical challenges by armed Buddhist monks were common during the sengoku period. The Empress Meishō (1624–96) also had great doubts when she heard about how the Spanish and Portuguese were settling in the New World, and thought that Japan would soon become one of the many countries in their possession3.

  • Why west was interested in Japan?

Portuguese, Spanish, and Dutch traders engaged in regular trade with Japan in the 16th and 17th centuries. Persistent attempts by the Europeans to convert the Japanese to Catholicism and their tendency to engage in unfair trading practices led Japan to expel most foreigners in 1639. For the two centuries that followed, Japan limited trade access to Dutch and Chinese ships with special charters.

There were several reasons why the United States became interested in revitalizing contact between Japan and the West in the mid-19th century. First, the combination of the opening of Chinese ports to regular trade and the annexation of California, creating an American port on the Pacific, ensured that there would be a steady stream of maritime traffic between North America and Asia. Then, as American traders in the Pacific replaced sailing ships with steam ships, they needed to secure coaling stations, where they could stop to take on provisions and fuel while making the long trip from the United States to China. The combination of its advantageous geographic position and rumors that Japan held vast deposits of coal increased the appeal of establishing commercial and diplomatic contacts with the Japanese. Additionally, the American whaling industry had pushed into the North Pacific by the mid-18th century, and sought safe harbors, assistance in case of shipwrecks, and reliable supply stations. In the years leading up to the Perry mission, a number of American sailors found themselves shipwrecked and stranded on Japanese shores, and tales of their mistreatment at the hands of the unwelcoming Japanese spread through the merchant community and across the United States.

The same combination of economic considerations and belief in Manifest Destiny that motivated U.S. expansion across the North American continent also drove American merchants and missionaries to journey across the Pacific. At the time, many Americans believed that they had a special responsibility to modernize and civilize the Chinese and Japanese. In the case of Japan, missionaries felt that Protestant Christianity would be accepted where Catholicism had generally been rejected. Other Americans argued that, even if the Japanese were unreceptive to Western ideals, forcing them to interact and trade with the world was a necessity that would ultimately benefit both nations.

  • Opening strategies of westernization.
  • Trade.

In 1539, the Chinese had confiscated the cargo of Japanese ships participating in the tribute trade. In 1544 they had turned away Japanese attempts to renew the tributary trade. This was enough to induce Japanese hostility, and enmity was further heightened by political changes in Japan. By the middle of the sixteenth century the Ashikaga shogunate which had accepted nominal Chinese suzerainty was on its last legs. It was succeeded by a series of three ruthless military dictators, Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and Ieyasu, who created a powerful unified system of government. They completely repudiated the idea of Chinese suzerainty.

These political developments occurred at the same time as Japan became a major silver producer. Rich deposits were discovered in the 1530s. The export potential was very large. The Chinese market was hungry for silver, and the gold/silver price ratio was much more favourable to silver in China than in Japan. As the Chinese would not allow Japanese ships to enter their harbours, the main carriers of Japanese silver to China were Chinese pirates and the Portuguese.

Portuguese ships were able to bring Indonesian spices from Malacca to Macao, sell them in China, buy Chinese silks and gold, go from Macao to harbours in the south of Japan (first Hirado and then Nagasaki), sell these products, buy Japanese silver, sell it in Macao, and buy silk again for shipment to Japan or their depot in Goa.

Portuguese trade was also accompanied by Jesuit missions. Francis Xavier was in Japan in 1549– 51, and Jesuits were very successful in getting converts in the south of Japan. Eventually, the number of Japanese Christians rose to about 300 000 (many more converts than the Jesuits made in Goa or in China). Japanese were interested in Portuguese ships, maps and navigation, and learned something of these two techniques. They were even more interested in guns. Portuguese technology of that epoch was reproduced in Japanese namban (southern barbarian) art which is displayed most clearly in very large multi–panelled lacquer screens. The first Portuguese to arrive in 1543 had firearms which were new to Japan. The potential of this new weaponry was quickly appreciated by the military who managed to copy the guns and manufacture them in Japan. They had an important effect in deciding the outcome of the Japanese civil wars. After 1615, the new shogunate began a successful policy to eliminate firearms and restrict the use of swords to the samurai.

In 1596, the Spanish authorities in Manila tried to replicate Portuguese successes in Japan, and sent a mission of Franciscan missionaries to proselytise. The Japanese got the impression that Spain might want to take over as they had the Philippines, and on Hideyoshi’s order the Spanish missionaries and 19 of their converts were crucified at Nagasaki. From that point on, Japan became increasingly hostile to Portuguese missionary activities, and made contact with English and Dutch traders who had no religious ambitions. Eventually Christianity became illegal, and the Portuguese were expelled in 1639. Henceforth trade with the Japanese mainland was confined to Chinese and Dutch traders.

  • Missionaries.

The first known appearance of organized Christianity in Japan was the arrival of the Portuguese Catholics in 1549. Francis Xavier arrived in Japan with three Japanese Catholic converts intending to start a church in the Nagasaki area. The local Japanese people initially assumed that the foreigners were from India and that Christianity was a new “Indian faith“. These mistaken impressions were due to already existing ties between the Portuguese and India; the Indian city of Goa was a central base for the Portuguese East India Company at the time, and a significant portion of the crew on board their ships were Indian Christians.4 Later on, the Roman Catholic missionary activities were exclusively performed by Portuguese-sponsored Jesuits and Spanish-sponsored mendicant orders, such as the Franciscans and Dominicans. Francisco Xavier (a Catholic Saint),5 Cosme de Torres (a Jesuit priest), and John Fernandez were the first who arrived in Kagoshima with hopes to bring Christianity to Japan. Xavier and the Jesuit order was held in good esteem and his efforts seemed to have been rewarded with a thriving community of converts.6 At baptism, these converts were given Portuguese “Christian names” and encouraged to adopt Western culture. This practice contributed to suspicions that the converts were in reality foreign agents working to subvert social order.6 Under Oda Nobunaga, the Jesuits enjoyed the favor of the shogunate, but the situation began to change once Toyotomi Hideyoshi‘s suspicions were aroused against Christianity.

Under Hideyoshi and then under the succeeding Tokugawa shogunate, Catholic Christianity was repressed and adherents were persecuted. During these times, many Christians were killed in Japan, some by crucifixion; most famously, the twenty-six martyrs of Japan were tortured and crucified on crosses outside Nagasaki to discourage Christianity in 1597. Following a brief respite that occurred as Tokugawa Ieyasu rose to power and pursued trade with the Portuguese powers, there were further persecutions and martyrdoms in 1613, 1630, and 1632. By this point, after the Shimabara Rebellion, the remaining Christians had been forced to publicly renounce their faith. Many continued practicing Christianity in secret, in modern times becoming known as the “hidden Christians” (kakure kirishitan). These secret believers would often conceal Christian iconography within closed shrines, lanterns or inconspicuous parts of buildings. For example, Himeji Castle has a Christian cross on one of its 17th-century roof tiles, in place of a mon, indicating that one of its occupants was a secret Christian.7 Drawn from the oral histories of Japanese Catholic communities, Shusaku Endo‘s acclaimed historical novel “Silence” provides detailed fictionalised accounts of the persecution of Christian communities and the suppression of the Church.

After Japan was opened to greater foreign interaction in 1853, many Christian clergymen were sent from Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox churches, though proselytism was still banned. After the Meiji Restoration, freedom of religion was introduced in 1871, giving all Christian communities the right to legal existence and preaching. Since World War II the number of Japanese Christians has been slowly increasing.8

  • Opening to west: Origin and growth.

In the 19th century, after a long period of isolationism, China and then Japan came under pressure from the West to open to foreign trade and relations. The Industrial Revolution in Europe and the United States had created a wide gap between them and the West, leaving the two Asian nations behind technologically and military. In that period, neither of them had the power to stand up to the Western nations, and eventually both had to sign unequal treaties that forced them to open their ports and cities to foreign merchants.

However, the way this process happened in each country and their reaction to it were very different, attracting the interest of many historians8 (Lockwood, 1956). How could two civilizations apparently so similar to each other react so differently to the same historical event? This essay, therefore, will argue that the main differences in Japan and China’s response to the West in the 19th century were that Japan yielded to Western pressure to open to trade while China refused to, and that Japan successfully modernized while China failed to. It will also present as the reasons for the difference in initial reaction China’s lesser understanding of the West and the historical timing of the Western intrusion; and as the reasons for the difference in modernization Japan’s familiarity with borrowing culturally from others, the rise of its reformist elite, and its pluralistic political system.

First of all, the way China and Japan reacted to the West’s increasing pressure to open to trade was very different. Both countries had long maintained isolationist tendencies, with limited commerce with the West. China welcomed foreign trade, but western merchants had no privileges there and were confined to Canton, where they could only deal with the Co-hong, a group of traders9 (Edwardes, 1973). Japan was even stricter, allowing commerce only with the Dutch, who had access to only one port, Dejima (Rosenberg, 1978)10.

This situation was not to be accepted by the Western nations for long, however, and by 1834 Lord Napier was sent by Britain to pressure the Chinese into allowing a more open trade. The Chinese government rejected his requests, and animosity arose between the two nations, with Chinese mobs surrounding the merchants’ quarter in Canton9 (Edwardes, 1973). Tensions eased temporarily, but the situation precipitated due to the British illicit trade in opium. In 1839, the new imperial commissioner Lin Tze-hsu arrived in Canton and confiscated 20,000 chests of opium from the British. Further disagreements, especially concerning the British’s refusal to hand over to Chinese authorities a sailor accused of killing a Chinese man, led to an armed naval confrontation in November 1839. This marked the beginning of the first of the Opium Wars, which would result in Chinese defeat and the establishment of a system of unequal treaties9 (Edwardes, 1973) (Martin, 1968) (Fairbank and Reischauer,1989)11.

Japan, on the contrary, was much more receptive to the demands of Western envoys. In 1853 Commodore Perry was sent by the United states to give an ultimatum to Japan to open its ports, and when he returned the next year the Japanese authorities accepted to negotiate with him (Storry, 1960) (Rosenberg, 1978)12. This was a very different attitude to that of the Chinese, whose “view of the non-Chinese world recognized no appreciable difference between merchants and governments. All were barbarians” (Edwardes, 1973, p.298)13, and therefore refused to recognize the threat represented by the British officials. In the end, treaties with the West, through which China and Japan’s long-lasting seclusion came to an end, were signed by both nations: the Treaty of Kanagawa by Japan (Hall, 1979)14 and the Treaty of Nanking by China (Martin, 1968)15. However, China’s treaty was signed after heavy military losses and under much more unfavorable terms than Japan’s, due to its refusal to acknowledge the superior power of the West.

An important factor causing this difference of reactions to Western pressure between Japan and China was historical timing. Western nations didn’t force Japan to end its isolationism until the 1850s, more than a decade after the beginning of the First Opium War in China. This was because they were already engaged in other parts of Asia, which created a “buffer” (Norman, cited in Moulder 1977, p.128)16, and because its lack of resources and demand for Western goods lessened Japan’s attractiveness to the West (Moulder, 1977)17. Despite its isolation, Japan was kept informed of what was happening abroad during the Opium War, and “the Dutch had repeatedly warned them through Nagasaki that they would have to accede to foreign demands” (Reischauer, 1978, p.119)18. Therefore, Japan was able to see first-hand the results of China’s defiance of Western demands, before it was its turn to respond to them. China, on the other hand, had no proof of Western military superiority and no previous examples to be guided by.

Another reason was that China’s knowledge of the West was much more limited than Japan’s. China’s rulers discouraged scholarly dissent, preferring people to limit themselves to following orthodox texts. These texts had been copied again and again since the Ming dynasty, and therefore presented an outdated view of the world. And yet they were the only available source of information about the West, because contact with foreigners was restricted to the Co-hong in Canton (Fairbank and Reischauer, 1989)19. Therefore, the Chinese officials couldn’t understand the great changes that had occurred in the West during the Industrial Revolution, and that they faced not simple “barbarians”, but nations with superior military power (Martin, 1968)20. And, as a result, “the expansive West caught China by surprise, and ways of handling foreign relations which had worked reasonably well for four centuries suddenly became useless” (Fairbank and Reischauer, 1989, p.271)21.

Japan was far more interested than China in gaining knowledge both about and from the West. Although Western books had been banned since the 17th century due to fear of Christian influence, starting in 1720 these laws were progressively relaxed until Dutch studies increasingly gained respectability (in part thanks to the works of Noro Genjo and Aoki Konyo), and by the end of the 18th century “there were students of the West in every part of Japan” (Keene, 1969, p.15)22. Even though Japan’s contact with the West was limited to the Netherlands, the shogunate, unlike the Qing rulers, not only allowed but also promoted learning about the West. It created the Institute for the Investigation of Barbarian Books, which in 1811 was an office in charge of translating Western texts, and by 1857 became a school of Western knowledge and languages. Scholars of Western knowledge were allowed to speak out and divulge information freely (Reischauer, 1978)23. It is not surprising, then, that the Japanese officials were able to more clearly assess their situation in relation to the Western powers than their Chinese counterparts, and to make a decision based on facts instead of prejudices.

A second difference between the Chinese and Japanese responses to the West was that Japan successfully modernized and became an industrialized power, while China failed to do so. After the overthrow of the shogunate and the start of the Meiji Restoration in 1868, Japan’s new leaders recognized that to make Japan a world power, they would have to modernize with the help of the West. Thus foreign technicians were brought to Japan and increasing numbers of Japanese were sent to Western countries to learn from them. Feudalism was abolished, new taxation and coinage systems established, and Western infrastructure and institutions, such as banks and railways, adopted (Storry, 1960).

China implemented Western innovations and attempted to modernize as well, starting after the suppression of the Taiping rebellion in 1864. However, this happened on a much more limited scale than in Japan; railroads, new weapons and other Western innovations were brought in, but they only affected a small part of the population and didn’t really change Chinese life (Fairbank and Reischauer, 1989)24. China’s rulers failed to understand that the achievements of the West had been the product of deep structural changes, and that “to modernize, it is necessary to adapt or change traditional institutions and ways of thought” (Edwardes, 1973, p.306)25. Therefore, modernization in China occurred only at a very superficial level (Edwardes, 1973)26. Japan, on the other hand, went so far as to change its political system by employing a Constitution that gave legislative powers to an Imperial Diet.

The first cause of the difference in the results of China and Japan’s attempts at modernization was China’s lack of a borrowing culture as opposed to Japan. Being the biggest, most powerful country in its region had given China the belief that it was the center of civilization. All non-Chinese were considered barbarians, and thus their culture inferior (Hao and Wang, 1980)27. In Japan, on the contrary, “there has never been the disdainful indifference that has often characterized the Chinese attitude towards foreigners. The Japanese have never been too proud to learn” (Storry, 1960, p.104). Japan had adopted much of China’s culture and had had to contend with its neighbor’s greater strength for long, so multiculturalism and the existence of many powerful states was not a new concept for the Japanese. They had benefitted from adopting other cultures’ innovations before, and did so again with the West (Reischauer, 1978)28.

A second cause was that in Japan a reform-minded elite took power, while China’s rulers were determined to preserve the traditional institutions. Japan’s decaying Tokugawa shogunate was overthrown in 1867 by a civil war that would lead to the Meiji Restoration, led by an elite of ambitious young people. The Meiji oligarchy, formed by extraordinary men like Ito and Matsukata, was committed to reform along Western lines for the benefit of the country, and worked towards it with energy and courage (Lockwood, 1956). In China, however, the ruling class was an opponent rather than a promoter of progress, being predominantly conservative. There were proponents of modernization in China’s upper classes, but their efforts were obstructed by the majority who saw too much innovation as dangerous. China’s ruling class was focused on “maintaining the power structure of the day and in using modernization only for personal and political aims within that structure” (Fairbank and Reischauer, 1989, p.336)29.

Finally, the pluralistic structure of Japan’s government was a third factor in determining its more successful modernization. There was a centralized authority, but it was balanced by the existence of a clan system. Therefore, power was far less unified than in China, where the rigid bureaucratic system stifled capitalist initiative and competition. Divided between the ruling class, the landlord-scholar-gentry class, and the peasants, there was no space in Chinese society for a mercantile class to rise and drive the country’s industrialization. Japan’s flexible political institutions, on the other hand, allowed economic competition between different groups, and there was an incentive for members of the merchant class to seek power through wealth. The Western clans themselves led the wave of innovation unleashed by business competition (Fairbank and Reischauer, 1989)30 (Lockwood, 1956)31.

In conclusion, we have seen how despite the similarities between these two civilizations, China and Japan responded very differently to pressure from the Western nations in the 19th century; Japan gave in to their demands for an increased opening of trade relations and successfully modernized, while China refused to break its isolationism and remained mired in the past, held back by its antiquated institutions. This essay has argued that Japan’s greater acquiescence to Western demands was caused by these demands coming later than in China and by Japan having more knowledge of the West. Japan’s borrowing culture, dynamic elite and pluralistic political system were given as the factors behind Japan’s more efficient modernization and industrialization. Although Japan is seen as having benefited more from contact with the West than China, the latter’s recent vertiginous economic rise, overtaking Japan’s, challenges this view. It remains to be seen whether it is too early to fully assess the effects of Western influence in East Asia since the 19th century.

  • Trade.

By the middle of the sixteenth century the Ashikaga shogunate which had accepted nominal Chinese suzerainty was on its last legs. It was succeeded by a series of three ruthless military dictators, Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and Ieyasu, who created a powerful unified system of government. They completely repudiated the idea of Chinese suzerainty.

These political developments occurred at the same time as Japan became a major silver producer. Rich deposits were discovered in the 1530s. The export potential was very large. The Chinese market was hungry for silver, and the gold/silver price ratio was much more favourable to silver in China than in Japan. As the Chinese would not allow Japanese ships to enter their harbours, the main carriers of Japanese silver to China were Chinese pirates and the Portuguese.

Portuguese ships were able to bring Indonesian spices from Malacca to Macao, sell them in China, buy Chinese silks and gold, go from Macao to harbours in the south of Japan (first Hirado and then Nagasaki), sell these products, buy Japanese silver, sell it in Macao, and buy silk again for shipment to Japan or their depot in Goa.

Portuguese trade was also accompanied by Jesuit missions. Francis Xavier was in Japan in 1549– 51, and Jesuits were very successful in getting converts in the south of Japan. Eventually, the number of Japanese Christians rose to about 300 000 (many more converts than the Jesuits made in Goa or in China). Japanese were interested in Portuguese ships, maps and navigation, and learned something of these two techniques. They were even more interested in guns. Portuguese technology of that epoch was reproduced in Japanese namban (southern barbarian) art which is displayed most clearly in very large multi–panelled lacquer screens. The first Portuguese to arrive in 1543 had firearms which were new to Japan. The potential of this new weaponry was quickly appreciated by the military who managed to copy the guns and manufacture them in Japan. They had an important effect in deciding the outcome of the Japanese civil wars. After 1615, the new shogunate began a successful policy to eliminate firearms and restrict the use of swords to the samurai.

In 1596, the Spanish authorities in Manila tried to replicate Portuguese successes in Japan, and sent a mission of Franciscan missionaries to proselytise. The Japanese got the impression that Spain might want to take over as they had the Philippines, and on Hideyoshi’s order the Spanish missionaries and 19 of their converts were crucified at Nagasaki. From that point on, Japan became increasingly hostile to Portuguese missionary activities, and made contact with English and Dutch traders who had no religious ambitions. Eventually Christianity became illegal, and the Portuguese were expelled in 1639. Henceforth trade with the Japanese mainland was confined to Chinese and Dutch traders.

  • Missionaries.

The first known appearance of organized Christianity in Japan was the arrival of the Portuguese Catholics in 1549. Francis Xavier arrived in Japan with three Japanese Catholic converts intending to start a church in the Nagasaki area. The local Japanese people initially assumed that the foreigners were from India and that Christianity was a new “Indian faith“. These mistaken impressions were due to already existing ties between the Portuguese and India; the Indian city of Goa was a central base for the Portuguese East India Company at the time, and a significant portion of the crew on board their ships were Indian Christians.32 Later on, the Roman Catholic missionary activities were exclusively performed by Portuguese-sponsored Jesuits and Spanish-sponsored mendicant orders, such as the Franciscans and Dominicans. Francisco Xavier (a Catholic Saint),33 Cosme de Torres (a Jesuit priest), and John Fernandez were the first who arrived in Kagoshima with hopes to bring Christianity to Japan. Xavier and the Jesuit order was held in good esteem and his efforts seemed to have been rewarded with a thriving community of converts.34 At baptism, these converts were given Portuguese “Christian names” and encouraged to adopt Western culture. This practice contributed to suspicions that the converts were in reality foreign agents working to subvert social order.35 Under Oda Nobunaga, the Jesuits enjoyed the favor of the shogunate, but the situation began to change once Toyotomi Hideyoshi‘s suspicions were aroused against Christianity.

Under Hideyoshi and then under the succeeding Tokugawa shogunate, Catholic Christianity was repressed and adherents were persecuted. During these times, many Christians were killed in Japan, some by crucifixion; most famously, the twenty-six martyrs of Japan were tortured and crucified on crosses outside Nagasaki to discourage Christianity in 1597. Following a brief respite that occurred as Tokugawa Ieyasu rose to power and pursued trade with the Portuguese powers, there were further persecutions and martyrdoms in 1613, 1630, and 1632. By this point, after the Shimabara Rebellion, the remaining Christians had been forced to publicly renounce their faith. Many continued practicing Christianity in secret, in modern times becoming known as the “hidden Christians“. These secret believers would often conceal Christian iconography within closed shrines, lanterns or inconspicuous parts of buildings. For example, Himeji Castle has a Christian cross on one of its 17th-century roof tiles, in place of a mon, indicating that one of its occupants was a secret Christian.36 Drawn from the oral histories of Japanese Catholic communities, Shusaku Endo‘s acclaimed historical novel “Silence” provides detailed fictionalised accounts of the persecution of Christian communities and the suppression of the Church.

After Japan was opened to greater foreign interaction in 1853, many Christian clergymen were sent from Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox churches, though proselytism was still banned. After the Meiji Restoration, freedom of religion was introduced in 1871, giving all Christian communities the right to legal existence and preaching. Since World War II the number of Japanese Christians has been slowly increasing.37

  • Mathew Perry.

Although he is often credited with opening Japan to the western world, Perry was not the first westerner to visit the islands. Portuguese, Spanish, and Dutch traders engaged in regular trade with Japan in the 16th and 17th centuries. Persistent attempts by the Europeans to convert the Japanese to Catholicism and their tendency to engage in unfair trading practices led Japan to expel most foreigners in 1639. For the two centuries that followed, Japan limited trade access to Dutch and Chinese ships with special charters.

There were several reasons why the United States became interested in revitalizing contact between Japan and the West in the mid-19th century. First, the combination of the opening of Chinese ports to regular trade and the annexation of California, creating an American port on the Pacific, ensured that there would be a steady stream of maritime traffic between North America and Asia. Then, as American traders in the Pacific replaced sailing ships with steam ships, they needed to secure coaling stations, where they could stop to take on provisions and fuel while making the long trip from the United States to China. The combination of its advantageous geographic position and rumors that Japan held vast deposits of coal increased the appeal of establishing commercial and diplomatic contacts with the Japanese. Additionally, the American whaling industry had pushed into the North Pacific by the mid-18th century, and sought safe harbors, assistance in case of shipwrecks, and reliable supply stations. In the years leading up to the Perry mission, a number of American sailors found themselves shipwrecked and stranded on Japanese shores, and tales of their mistreatment at the hands of the unwelcoming Japanese spread through the merchant community and across the United States.

The same combination of economic considerations and belief in Manifest Destiny that motivated U.S. expansion across the North American continent also drove American merchants and missionaries to journey across the Pacific. At the time, many Americans believed that they had a special responsibility to modernize and civilize the Chinese and Japanese. In the case of Japan, missionaries felt that Protestant Christianity would be accepted where Catholicism had generally been rejected. Other Americans argued that, even if the Japanese were unreceptive to Western ideals, forcing them to interact and trade with the world was a necessity that would ultimately benefit both nations.

Commodore Perry’s mission was not the first American overture to the Japanese. In the 1830s, the Far Eastern squadron of the U.S. Navy sent several missions from its regional base in Guangzhou (Canton), China, but in each case, the Japanese did not permit them to land, and they lacked the authority from the U.S. Government to force the issue. In 1851, President Millard Fillmore authorized a formal naval expedition to Japan to return shipwrecked Japanese sailors and request that Americans stranded in Japan be returned to the United States. He sent Commodore John Aulick to accomplish these tasks, but before Aulick left Guangzhou for Japan, he was relieved of his post and replaced by Commodore Matthew Perry. A lifetime naval officer, Perry had distinguished himself in the Mexican-American War and was instrumental in promoting the United States Navy’s conversion to steam power.

Perry first sailed to the Ryukyus and the Bonin Islands southwest and southeast of the main Japanese islands, claiming territory for the United States, and demanding that the people in both places assist him. He then sailed north to Edo (Tokyo) Bay, carrying a letter from the U.S. President addressed to the Emperor of Japan. By addressing the letter to the Emperor, the United States demonstrated its lack of knowledge about the Japanese government and society. At that time, the Japanese emperor was little more than a figurehead, and the true leadership of Japan was in the hands of the Tokugawa Shogunate.

Perry arrived in Japanese waters with a small squadron of U.S. Navy ships, because he and others believed the only way to convince the Japanese to accept western trade was to display a willingness to use its advanced firepower. At the same time, Perry brought along a variety of gifts for the Japanese Emperor, including a working model of a steam locomotive, a telescope, a telegraph, and a variety of wines and liquors from the West, all intended to impress upon the Japanese the superiority of Western culture. His mission was to complete an agreement with the Japanese Government for the protection of shipwrecked or stranded Americans and to open one or more ports for supplies and refueling. Displaying his audacity and readiness to use force, Perry’s approach into the forbidden waters around Tokyo convinced the Japanese authorities to accept the letter.

The following spring, Perry returned with an even larger squadron to receive Japan’s answer. The Japanese grudgingly agreed to Perry’s demands, and the two sides signed the Treaty of Kanagawa on March 31, 1854. According to the terms of the treaty, Japan would protect stranded seamen and open two ports for refueling and provisioning American ships: Shimoda and Hakodate. Japan also gave the United States the right to appoint consuls to live in these port cities, a privilege not previously granted to foreign nations. This treaty was not a commercial treaty, and it did not guarantee the right to trade with Japan. Still, in addition to providing for distressed American ships in Japanese waters, it contained a most-favored-nation clause, so that all future concessions Japan granted to other foreign powers would also be granted to the United States. As a result, Perry’s treaty provided an opening that would allow future American contact and trade with Japan.

  • Meiji Period.

According to the quote of Palmer and Perkins, “Imperialism can be discussed, denounced, or defended for but it cannot be defined38.”, U.S. imperialism was not confirmed to Spain’s holdings. With growing U.S. interests in the Pacific, in 1899-1900 Secretary of State Hay issued his famous “Open Door” notes that the China trade should be open to all and that China should not be broken up into European and Japanese spheres of influence. This began the fateful link of Chinese and U.S. interests that turned us into China’s protector, soon to collide with Japan. As for Hawaii, where American settlers had already taken over, we’d better take it or Japan will39.

During the Meiji period, the new Government of Meiji Japan also modernized foreign policy, an important step in making Japan a full member of the international community. The traditional East Asia worldview was based not on an international society of national units but on cultural distinctions and tributary relationships. Monks, scholars, and artists, rather than professional diplomatic envoys, had generally served as the conveyors of foreign policy. Foreign relations were related more to the sovereign’s desires than to the public interest.

When the Tokugawa seclusion (the sakoku policy) was forcibly breached in 1853–54 by Commodore Matthew C. Perry of the United States Navy, Japan found that geography no longer ensured security—the country was defenseless against military pressures and economic exploitation by the Western powers. For Japan to emerge from the feudal period, it had to avoid the colonial fate of other Asian countries by establishing genuine national independence and equality.

After the Black Ships, Perry’s naval squadron, had compelled Japan to enter into relations with the Western world, the first foreign policy debate was over whether Japan should embark on an extensive modernization to cope with the threat of the “eastward advance of Western power,” which had already violated the independence of China, or expel the “barbarians” under the parole sonno joi and return to seclusion. Opening the country caused an upheaval that in the end caused the demise of the Tokugawa bakufu, but the Shoguns of the period were too weak to pose a serious opposition. The opening of Japan accelerated a revolution that was just waiting to happen.

Beginning with the Meiji Restoration of 1868, which established a new, centralized regime, Japan set out to “gather wisdom from all over the world” and embarked on an ambitious program of military, social, political, and economic reforms that transformed it within a generation into a modern nation-state and major world power. The Meiji oligarchy was aware of Western progress, and “learning missions” were sent abroad to absorb as much of it as possible. The Iwakura mission, the most important one, was led by Iwakura Tomomi, Kido Takayoshi and Okubo Toshimichi, contained forty-eight members in total and spent two years (1871–73) touring the United States and Europe, studying every aspect of modern nations, such as government institutions, courts, prison systems, schools, the import-export business, factories, shipyards, glass plants, mines, and other enterprises. Upon returning, mission members called for domestic reforms that would help Japan catch up with the West.

The revision of unequal treaties, forced on Japan in the 1850s and 60s, became a top priority. The Meiji leaders also sketched a new vision for a modernized Japan’s leadership role in Asia, but they realized that this role required that Japan develop its national strength, cultivate nationalism among the population, and carefully craft policies toward potential enemies. No longer could Westerners be seen as “barbarians,” for example. In time, Japan formed a corps of professional diplomats.

  • World war: Japan and World.
  • Japan-USA.

Japan is one of Asia’s most successful democracies and largest economies. The U.S.-Japan alliance is the cornerstone of U.S. security interests in Asia and is fundamental to regional stability and prosperity. It is based on shared vital interests and values. These include stability in the Asia-Pacific region, the preservation and promotion of political and economic freedoms, support for human rights and democratic institutions, and securing of prosperity for the people of both countries and the international community as a whole.

Japan provides bases as well as financial and material support to U.S. forward-deployed forces, which are essential for maintaining stability in the region. Over the past decade the alliance has been strengthened through revised defense guidelines, which expand Japan’s noncombatant role in a regional contingency, the renewal of the agreement on host nation support of U.S. forces stationed in Japan, and an ongoing process called the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI). The DPRI redefines roles, missions, and capabilities of alliance forces and outlines key realignment and transformation initiatives, including reducing the number of U.S. troops stationed in Okinawa, enhancing interoperability and communication between the two countries’ respective commands, and broadening cooperation in the area of ballistic missile defense.

Because of the two countries’ combined economic and technological impact on the world, the U.S.-Japan relationship has become global in scope. The United States and Japan cooperate on a broad range of global issues, including development assistance, combating communicable disease such as the spread of HIV/AIDS and avian influenza, and protecting the environment and natural resources. The countries also collaborate in science and technology in such areas as mapping the human genome, research on aging, and international space exploration.

Japan contributes irreplaceable political, financial, and moral support to U.S.-Japan diplomatic efforts. The United States consults closely with Japan and the Republic of Korea on policy regarding North Korea. The United States works closely with Japan and Australia under the auspices of the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue and the Security and Defense Cooperation Forum to exchange views and increase coordination on global and regional initiatives. In Southeast Asia, U.S.-Japan cooperation is vital for stability and for political and economic reform. Outside Asia, Japanese political and financial support has substantially strengthened the U.S. position on a variety of global geopolitical problems, including the Persian Gulf, Middle East peace efforts, and the Balkans. Japan is an indispensable partner in the United Nations and the second-largest contributor to the UN budget. Japan broadly supports the United States on nonproliferation and nuclear issues.

The United States established diplomatic relations with Japan in 1858. During World War II, diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan were severed when both nations declared war on each other in the wake of Japan’s 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. After years of fighting in the Pacific region, which included the U.S. atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan signed an instrument of surrender in 1945. Normal diplomatic relations were reestablished in 1952, when the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, which had overseen the postwar Allied occupation of Japan since 1945, disbanded.

U.S. Assistance to Japan

The United States provides no development assistance to Japan.

Bilateral Economic Relations

U.S. economic policy toward Japan is aimed at increasing access to Japan’s markets and two-way investment, stimulating domestic demand-led economic growth, promoting economic restructuring, improving the climate for U.S. investors, and raising the standard of living in both the United States and Japan. The U.S.-Japan bilateral economic relationship–based on enormous flows of trade, investment, and finance–is strong, mature, and increasingly interdependent. It also is firmly rooted in the shared interest and responsibility of the United States and Japan to promote global growth, open markets, and a vital world trading system.

Japan is a major market for many U.S. products, including agricultural products, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, films and music, commercial aircraft, nonferrous metals, plastics, medical and scientific supplies, and machinery. U.S. imports from Japan include vehicles, machinery, optic and medical instruments, and organic chemicals. U.S. direct investment in Japan is mostly in the finance/insurance, manufacturing, nonbank holding companies, and wholesale sectors. Japanese direct investment in the U.S. is mostly in the wholesale trade and manufacturing sectors.

The United States and Japan cooperate in a number of international economic fora. Japan formally began participating in the ongoing Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations in July 2013, joining 11 other Asia-Pacific countries, including the United States, that are aiming to conclude a comprehensive, high-standard free trade agreement. In parallel with the TPP multiparty negotiations, the United States and Japan are also engaged in bilateral negotiations to address issues in the areas of automotive trade, insurance, and other non-tariff measures.

Japan‘s Membership in International Organizations

Japan and the United States belong to a number of the same international organizations, including the United Nations, G-8, G-20, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, ASEAN Regional Forum, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Trade Organization. Japan also is a Partner for Cooperation with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and an observer to the Organization of American States40.

  • Japan-West Trade Relations.

In its economic relations, Japan is both a major trading nation and one of the largest international investors in the world. In many respects, international trade is the lifeblood of Japan’s economy. Imports and exports totaling the equivalent of nearly US$522 billion in 1990 meant that Japan was the world’s third largest trading nation after the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). Trade was once the primary form of Japan’s international economic relationships, but in the 1980s its rapidly rising foreign investments added a new and increasingly important dimension, broadening the horizons of Japanese businesses and giving Japan new world prominence.

  1. Economic interactions.

Japan and China are the giants of Asia. The future of their relationship is absolutely critical to the peace and security of Asia. That relationship is complex: for over two millennia, beginning in the third century BC, the pair has maintained cordial relations. For fifty years during that period, from 1894 to 1945, they were at war. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, both struggle with the legacies of war and peace as they seek to define their roles in a rapidly changing world. Economic relations have played a pivotal role in their relationship, solidifying the foundation on which political relations are built, providing a balm in times of trouble, and marking the way to formal diplomatic relations. This essay explores the interaction of economic and political forces in Sino–Japanese relations. It is divided into five sections corresponding to five distinct phases of the relationship. In the first section, I focus on the building blocks forged by China and Japan over two millennia of interaction until the outbreak of war in 1894. I show how initial trading relations between the mainland and the archipelago blossomed into cultural and political exchange in a process which brought massive learning and change to Japan. I argue that these ties sustained Sino–Japanese relations in times of conflict, as they slipped seamlessly into an informal realm which allowed both countries to keep relations on an even keel even in the face of formal political discord. In the second section, I focus on the fifty years of conflict, showing that during this time, Japan’s economic ambitions ran roughshod over past patterns of interaction, even as Japan’s imperial armies overran the continent in a devastating war which would scar the relationship indefinitely. In the third section, I discuss Sino–Japanese relations during the Cold War era, focusing in particular on the period from the end of the war in 1945 to the normalization of relations in 1972. I describe how the US–Japan Security Treaty dominated relations between China and Japan, and argue that both countries attempted to bolster economic ties with an eye to eventual political reconciliation. In the fourth section, I examine the brief period between 1972 and 1978 when Japan seized the diplomatic initiative to normalize relations and sign a peace treaty with China. I explain how both China and Japan reaped the fruits of their earlier endeavors and experienced a surge in economic interaction. In the final section, I focus on the complex period from 1979—when China “opened its door”—to the present. I argue that economic interaction continues to provide the foundation for the political relationship, but also affirm that both countries are struggling to come to terms with a legacy of war and define their roles in an evolving post-Cold War security framework41.

  • Japan-Middle East.

Despite the absence of cultural, historical or religious bonds, Japan and the Middle East have become indispensable geostrategic partners. Japan is resource-poor and a leading importer of natural gas and oil. Japanese-Middle Eastern relations have historically revolved around that dynamic. Tokyo’s Middle Eastern foreign policy, which has been traditionally passive, has recently shifted toward a more activist role with the objective of protecting Japan’s energy interests in the region. Given that Japan imports more than 80 percent of its crude oil from the Gulf Cooperation Council and Iran, stability in the Middle East is of great interest and concern to Japan.

The Fukushima nuclear disaster prompted the shutdown of all of Japan’s nuclear reactors, and no timetable has been announced for restarting any of them. As a result, the average Japanese household’s electricity bill has risen by 30 percent, and the nation’s trade deficit has reached record high levels. Japan has therefore become increasingly reliant on the Persian Gulf’s liquefied natural gas (LNG). Given that Qatar is the world’s leading supplier of LNG, and Japan is Qatar’s top export partner (and the world’s leading LNG importer), Tokyo and Doha have become increasingly valuable toward one another. Much meaning was therefore attributed to Prime Minister Abe’s six-day trip to the Middle East in August this year – his second to the region since being reelected in 2012.

During that trip, Abe and the Qatari Prime Minister issued a statement reiterating the importance of the bilateral relationship, and the stability it brings to the global LNG marketplace. The promotion of Japanese business interests was also an objective of the trip. As Qatar is expected to begin the construction of infrastructure projects in preparation for the 2022 World Cup, the two leaders agreed to cooperate on building stadiums, railways and sewage systems, where Japanese firms clearly have an advantage. Abe’s two-day stop in Bahrain also led to four memoranda of understanding in the areas of healthcare, medical research, anti-crime measures and agriculture.

While the Japanese military is prohibited by its post-war constitution from engaging in offensive activities, the Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF) have been deployed to the Middle East on numerous occasions in other capacities, such as humanitarian and peacekeeping missions. For example, the JSDF were deployed to the Persian Gulf in 1991 to conduct minesweeping operations in the aftermath of the Gulf War (which marked the first time that Tokyo deployed its armed forces overseas since World War II). Between 1996 and 2012 Japan also sent peacekeeping troops to the Golan Heights and the JSDF were deployed to Iraq to aid in reconstruction efforts.

  • Japan-China Relations.

China and Japan are geographically separated by the East China Sea. Japan has been strongly influenced by China with its language, architecture, culture, religion, philosophy, and law. When Western countries such as the British and the United States forced Japan to open trading in the mid-19th century, Japan moved towards modernization (Meiji Restoration), viewing China as an antiquated civilization, unable to defend itself against Western forces in part due to the First and Second Opium Wars and Anglo-French Expeditions from the 1860s to the 1880s.

The relationship between China and Japan has been strained at times by Japan’s refusal to acknowledge its wartime past to the satisfaction of China. Revisionist comments made by prominent Japanese officials and some Japanese history textbooks regarding the 1937 Nanking Massacre have been a focus of particular controversy. During the Meiji Era, China was one of the first countries to feel Japanese Imperialism. After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, relations with Japan changed from hostility and an absence of contact to cordiality and extremely close cooperation in many fields. During the 1960s the two countries resumed trade for the first time since World War II under the Liao–Takasaki Agreement. On 29 September 1972, Japan and China signed a treaty establishing diplomatic relations between the states. The 1990s led to an enormous growth in China’s economic welfare.

Trade between Japan and China was one of the many reasons China was able to grow in the double-digit rates during the 1980s and 1990s. Japan was in the forefront among leading industrialized nations in restoring closer economic and political relations with China. Resumption of Japan’s multi-billion dollar investments to China and increased visits to China by Japanese officials, culminating in the October 1992 visit of Emperor Akihito, gave a clear indication that Japan considered closer ties with China in its economic and strategic interest. Despite a 1995 apology regarding World War II by Japanese Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama, tensions still remain, mostly because many Chinese feel there is a lack of true remorse for wartime crimes committed by Imperial Japanese forces. This has been reinforced by numerous visits to the Yasukuni Shrine by Japanese Prime Ministers, attempts to revise textbooks by Japanese nationalists, the continued dispute over Japan’s atrocities in the Nanking Massacre, and the resurgence of nationalism and militarism in Japan.42

  • Japan-Oceania Relations.

Before World War II, the Imperial Japanese Navy began construction of various airfields, fortifications, ports, and other military projects in the islands controlled under the South Pacific Mandate. It was from these fortifications in Palau, the Carolines and the Marshall Islands that a significant portion of the Japanese Navy disembarked towards the Philippines, New Guinea, Nauru and the Gilbert Islands during 1941-42 in the Pacific War.

By 1990 Japanese involvement in the newly independent island nations of Oceania increased due to rising commercial and strategic interests. Japan’s rapidly growing aid to the South Pacific was seen by many as a response to United States calls for greater burden-sharing and to the adoption of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, which gave states legal control over fishery resources within their 200-nautical-mile (370 km) exclusive economic zones. The US$98.3 million that Japan provided in aid to the region in 1989 was fourth behind France, Australia and the United States but was significantly more than was provided by New Zealand and Britain. Japanese companies also invested heavily in the tourism industry in the island nations43.

  • Role and policy of Japan towards united Nation.

Japan and the United Nations is a multilateral relations between Japan and the United Nations. Japan holds many international cooperations within the United Nations as a basic principle of its foreign policy. When Japan joined the UN in 1956, it did so with great enthusiasm and broad public support, for the international organization was seen to embody the pacified country’s hopes for a peaceful world order. Membership was welcomed by many Japanese who saw the UN as a guarantor of a policy of unarmed neutrality for their nation, in addition to the security arrangement they concluded with US in 1951. To others, support for the UN would be useful in masking or diluting Japan’s almost total dependence on the United States for its security. The government saw the UN as an ideal arena for its risk minimizing, omni directional foreign policy.

After the late 1950s, Japan participated actively in the social and economic activities of the UN’s various specialized agencies and other international organizations concerned with social, cultural, and economic improvement. During the 1970s, as it attained the status of an economic superpower, Japan was called on to play an increasingly large role in the UN. As Japan’s role increased and its contributions to UN socioeconomic development activities grew, many Japanese began to ask whether their country was being given an international position of responsibility commensurate with its economic power. There was even some sentiment, expressed as early as 1973, that Japan should be given a permanent seat on the UN Security Council with the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and China.

By 1990 Japan’s international cooperation efforts had reached a new level of involvement and activism. Japan contributed about 11 percent of the regular UN budget, second only to the United States, which contributed 25 percent. Japan was particularly active in UN peacekeeping activities and in 1989, for the first time, sent officials to observe and participate in UN peacekeeping efforts (in Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Namibia). Japan sent a small team to observe the February 1990 elections in Nicaragua. In 1992-93 Japan led UN supervision of the peace process and elections in Cambodia, providing approximately 2,000 people, which included members of the SDF.44

  • Japan and World Peace.
  • War & Terror.

Japan as one of the US allies in the East Asia responded quickly to the war led by the US. Within 45 minutes of the September 11 Attacks, Prime Minister Koizumi supported the US by giving assistance to defend US military base in Okinawa from any unexpected terrorist attacks and assisting to victim’s family of the attacks (Midford, 2003:330-1). Moreover, Units of the Japanese Navy that consisted of three destroyers and other ships accompanied the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk left Japanese coastal waters for positions in the Indian Ocean on 21 September 2001 (Katzenstein, 2002:431). This response was different to the response of Japan to the Gulf War in 1990. The Government of Japan responded too late and too little to support the US in the war against Iraq that invaded Kuwait (Midford, 2003:330). The limit participation of Japan in liberating K uwait probably was the bitterest memory for many Japanese especially when Kuwait excluded Japan in a list of allied countries thanked by Emir. Albeit Tokyo contributed $13 billion to the war efforts (Gaiko Forum in Min ford, 2003:338).45

  • Peace.

Japan’s security policy consists of three pillars – U.S. deterrence secured through the Japan-U. S. security arrangements, Japan’s own defense efforts and Japan’s diplomatic efforts to ensure stability in international politics. The Japan-U.S. security arrangements, above all, have enabled Japan to ensure the security of the nation with the minimum required self-defense capability during the East-West confrontation.

Despite the recent changes in the international situation, the importance of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements for Japan remains unchanged.

First, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty gives a stable political basis for the close alliance and cooperative relations between the two countries.

Second, close cooperative relations between the two countries symbolized by the Japan-U.S. security arrangements are one of the political frameworks supporting stability and development in the Asia-Pacific region. The Japan-U.S. security arrangements are indispensable for maintaining the presence of the United States in this region, which each country in the region recognizes as a stabilizing factor. At the same time, the security arrangements give international credibility to Japan’s policy of not becoming a major military power capable of threatening other nations.

Third, the difference in military capabilities between Japan, which firmly adheres to three non-nuclear principles, and the Soviet Union, which possess nuclear weapons, is starkly evident. In order to maintain peace and stability of Japan, therefore, the U.S. deterrence based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is necessary.

Fourth, the close relationship between Japan and the United States backed by the Japan-U.S. security arrangements is important in order for Japan to actively pursue dialogue with the Soviet Union and other countries. This is evident judging from the fact that East-West negotiations in Europe have progressed only because of the strong Western solidarity through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).46

08.       How did Japan become in to International Affairs? (Theoretical Perspective of International Relations):

According to the International Relation theory we have observed that the westernization of Japan fully follow the realistic view because the international relations theory says that-

theory of international relations is a set of ideas that explains how the international system works. Unlike an ideology, a theory of international relations is (at least in principle) backed up with concrete evidence. The two major theories of international relations are realism and liberalism.

National Interest

Most theories of international relations are based on the idea that states always act in accordance with their national interest, or the interests of that particular state. State interests often include self-preservation, military security, economic prosperity, and influence over other states. Sometimes two or more states have the same national interest. For example, two states might both want to foster peace and economic trade. And states with diametrically opposing national interests might try to resolve their differences through negotiation or even war.

 

Realism

According to realism, states work only to increase their own power relative to that of other states. Realism also claims the following:

  • The world is a harsh and dangerous place. The only certainty in the world is power. A powerful state will always be able to outdo—and outlast—weaker competitors. The most important and reliable form of power is military power.
  • A state’s primary interest is self-preservation. Therefore, the state must seek power and must always protect itself
  • There is no overarching power that can enforce global rules or punish bad behavior.
  • Moral behavior is very risky because it can undermine a state’s ability to protect itself.
  • The international system itself drives states to use military force and to war. Leaders may be moral, but they must not let moral concerns guide foreign policy.
  • International organizations and law have no power or force; they exist only as long as states accept them.

Politicians have practiced realism as long as states have existed. Most scholars and politicians during the Cold War viewed international relations through a realist lens. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union trusted the other, and each sought allies to protect itself and increase its political and military influence abroad. Realism has also featured prominently in the administration of George W. Bush.

Machiavelli

One of the best-known realist thinkers is the notorious Niccolo Machiavelli. In his book The Prince (1513), he advised rulers to use deceit and violence as tools against other states. Moral goals are so dangerous, he wrote, that to act morally will bring about disaster. He also gave advice about how to deal with conflicts among neighboring states and how to defend one’s homeland. Machiavelli’s name has become synonymous with nasty and brutal politics.

 

Liberalism

Liberalism emphasizes that the broad ties among states have both made it difficult to define national interest and decreased the usefulness of military power. Liberalism developed in the 1970s as some scholars began arguing that realism was outdated. Increasing globalization, the rapid rise in communications technology, and the increase in international trade meant that states could no longer rely on simple power politics to decide matters. Liberal approaches to international relations are also called theories of complex interdependence Liberalism claims the following:

  • The world is a harsh and dangerous place, but the consequences of using military power often outweigh the benefits. International cooperation is therefore in the interest of every state.
  • Military power is not the only form of power. Economic and social power matter a great deal too. Exercising economic power has proven more effective than exercising military power.
  • Different states often have different primary interests.
  • International rules and organizations can help foster cooperation, trust, and prosperity.

Example: Relations among the major Western powers fit a model of complex interdependence very well. The United States has significant disagreements with its European and Asian allies over trade and policy, but it is hard to imagine a circumstance in which the United States would use military power against any of these allies. Instead, the United States relies on economic pressure and incentives to achieve its policy aims.

 
Idealism

Idealism is a specific school of liberalism that stresses the need for states to pursue moral goals and to act ethically in the international arena. Idealists believe that behavior considered immoral on an interpersonal level is also immoral in foreign policy. Therefore, idealists argue that dishonesty, trickery, and violence should be shunned. In the United States, idealism has usually been associated with the Democratic Party since World War I.

Example: As he negotiated the treaty to end World War I in 1918, Woodrow Wilson worked to promote democracy and national self-determination. Wilson’s idealism led him to push hard for the creation of the League of Nations, an international organization that would fight aggression and protect the weak from the strong, in 1919. Scholars use the term Wilsonian to describe a person or group who advocates promoting democracy overseas in the name of idealism.

  • Conclusion.

When the United States sends a naval delegation, led by Commodore Matthew Perry, to “open” Japanese ports in 1853, the Japanese are well aware of the “Unequal Treaties” that have been imposed upon China in the previous ten years (since the Opium War of 1839-42) as a result of the superior military power of the Western nations. The Japanese respond to the challenge of the West.

Reform-minded samurai, reflecting the enormous changes that have taken place in the preceding Tokugawa period, effect political change. They launch the reform movement under the guise of restoring the emperor to power, thereby eliminating the power of the shogun, or military ruler, of the Tokugawa period. The emperor’s reign name is Meiji; hence the title, “Meiji Restoration” of 1868.

The Japanese carry out this modernization by very deliberate study, borrowing, and adaptation of Western political, military, technological, economic, and social forms repeating a pattern of deliberate borrowing and adaptation seen previously in the classical period when Japan studied Chinese civilization (particularly in the 7th century to 8th century).

Japan’s successful transformation into a modern, military power is demonstrated first in 1894-95 and then in 1905-6. Japan defeats China, long the preeminent power in East Asia, in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 over influence in the Korean peninsula. Japan defeats Russia, a major Western power, in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905-06 over rights in Manchuria and Korea. Chinese reformers and revolutionaries base themselves in Japan; Western nations take note of Japan’s new power.

In fine, we can say that Japan opened itself to international relations from the realistic view.

Reference

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2 Hellyer, Robert I. (2009), Defining engagement: Japan and global context, 1640-1868. Harvard University.

3 Agence France-Presse (2009-01-31). “S. Korea president faces protests from Buddhists”. The Straits Times. Retrieved 2009-01-31.)

4 Leupp, Gary P. (2003). Interracial Intimacy in Japan. Continuum International Publishing Group. p. 35. ISBN 0-8264-6074-7.

5 St. Francis Xavier“. Catholic Encyclopedia. New York: Robert Appleton Company. 1913.

6 Gonzáles, Justo L. (Jan 2004) The Story of Christianity, 3rd edition. Prince Press/Hendrickson Publishers. Volume 1, pages 405–406

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9 Japan–Oceania relations,http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japan%E2%80%93Oceania_relations ,23.5.2014.

10 Japanese foreign policy on Africa,http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_foreign_policy_on _Africa, 23.5.2014.

11 Fairbank, J.K. & Reischauer E.O. (1989) China: Tradition & Transformation. Rev. edn.Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.

12 M Muttagien, “Japan in the Global ‘War on Terrorism”, Global R Strategis, Th I, No. 2„luli-Desember 2007, Page 151-169.

13 Craig, A. & Reischauer, E. (1978) ‘Japan’s Response to the West’ in Japan: Tradition and Transformation. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

14 Hall, J. W. (1979) Japan from Prehistory to Modern Times. Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company.

15 Martin, C. (1968) The Boxer Rebellion. New York: Abelard-Schuman Limited.

16 Moulder, F. V. (1977) Japan, China, and the Modern World Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

17 ibid.

18 op. cit.

19 op. cit.

20 op. cit.

21 op. cit.

22 Keene, D. (1969) The Japanese Discovery of Europe, 1720-1830. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

23 op. cit.

24 op. cit.

25 Edwardes, M. (1973) ‘China and Japan’, in Johnson, D. (ed.) The World of Empires. London: Benn, pp. 289-333.

26 ibid.

27 Hao, Y. & Wang, E. (1980) ‘Changing Chinese views of Western relations, 1840-95’, in Twitchett, D. and Fairbank, J. (eds.) The Cambridge History of China. Vol. 2. 1st edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

28 op. cit.

29 op. cit.

30 op. cit.

31 Lockwood, W. W. (1956) ‘Japan’s Response to the West: The Contrast with China’, World Politics, 9(1), pp.37-54, JSTOR [Online]. Available at: www.jstor.org (Accessed: 27 Nov 2012).

32 Leupp, Gary P. (2003). Interracial Intimacy in Japan. Continuum International Publishing Group. p. 35. ISBN 0-8264-6074-7.

33 St. Francis Xavier“. Catholic Encyclopedia. New York: Robert Appleton Company. 1913.

34 Gonzáles, Justo L. (Jan 2004) The Story of Christianity, 3rd edition. Prince Press/Hendrickson Publishers. Volume 1, pages 405–406

35 ibid.

36 Guide to World Heritage Site Himeiji Castle. Ryuusenkaku.jp. Retrieved on 2011-06-15.

37 Japan Guide on Christianity in Japan. Japan-guide.com (2002-06-10). Retrieved on 2011-06-15.

38 Prakash Chandra, Theories of International Relations, Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., Mumbai, 2004, page 148.

39 Michael G. Roskin & Nicholas O. Berry, IR: The New World of International Relations, Prentice-Hall, Inc, New Jersey, 1993, page 29.

40 Katherine G. Burns, China and Japan: Economic Partnership to Political Ends, http://www. google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CDQQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.stimson.org%2Fimages%2Fuploads%2Fresearchpdfs%2Fburnspdf.pdf&ei=R0iAUCWOJCJrAfdzIDoBA&usg=AFQjCNFSuFNqlNO9NhtNK sE2MU58z_VoYg&s ig2=xXCZsmjYtJqqYbBLVrtWtA,23.5.2014.

41 Nanjing by the Numbers. Foreign Policy. 9 February 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/ articles/2010/02/09/nanjing_by_the_numbers,23.5.2014.

42 Daniel Wagner and Giorgio Cafiero, Japan’s Influence in the Middle East,http://www .huffingtonpost.com/daniel-wagner/japans-influence-in-the-m_b_4159850.html, 23.5.2014.

43 “Backlash over the alleged China curb on metal exports”. The Daily Telegraph, London, 29 Aug 2010. Retrieved 30 August 2010,http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/ industry/mining/7970872/Backlash-over-China-curb-on-metal-exports.html,23.5.2014.

44 http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japan_and_theUnited_Nations 25/05/14.

45 U.S. Relations With Japan, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/4142.htm, 23.5.2014.

46 2013 World Service Poll BBC,http://www.globescan.com/images/images/pressreleases/ bbc2013_country_ratings/2013_country_rating_poll_bbc_globescan.pdf,  23.5.2014.